Position papers

Why did a 'New World Disorder' replace Fukuyama's complacent notion of the 'End of History' in the post-Cold War environment of the 1990s

19 January 2021 564 Views

Introduction
This essay argues that the 'New World Disorder' replaced Fukuyama's idea of the 'End of History' for three main reasons: The emergence of unipolarity, the drive for "the New American Century" and economic disorder. The first chapter of the essay addresses the question how the end of bipolarity led to the loss of power balance and ushered in a more assertive American foreign and security policy based on interventionism and informed by the "securitisation" of threat. Chapter two argues that after the Soviet collapse the US sought not only global leadership but also a New American Century informed by the idea of "exceptionalism". In this chapter we discuss two main documents that called for the New American Century: the "Pentagon's Defence Planning Guidance" (DPG) and the think tank "Project for New American Century" (PNAC). The third chapter discusses the economic disorder that followed from the end of socialism. Contrary to Fukuyama's predictions, the capitalist system did not bring about prosperity and wealth to humanity. It created a more class-based world, and further distanced the industrialised countries from the periphery. The capitalist system also proved self-deceptive when a financial crisis hit the US, and later other countries, in 2008. The crisis revealed a deeper systemic crisis. In order to support our analysis of the relationship between power and disorder, we rely on the concept of 'securitization' as advanced and defined by the Copenhagen School. In the chapter on economic disorder, we adopt the thesis that liberal capitalism represented a neo-imperialist reach which widened the gulf between the rich and the poor and the centre and the periphery.

I-Power and Unipolarity
The end of bipolarity in the 1990s opened the door for a unipolar world that the US approached not through seeking peaceful settlement of conflict but through interventionism. Washington focused heavily on the issue of security and the need to use power in order to achieve what President Bush called 'New World Order'.
One of the most articulate critiques of the "New World Order" is Noam Chomsky's Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance (2003). In this book, Chomsky reveals the 'imperial Grand strategy' of the US and shows how such strategy has been a formula for consistent dominance of the world. It has led to chaos, non-democracy and injustice and has reinforced nuclear 'proliferation' and 'terrorism' (Chomsky 2003, pp. 217-237). On the other hand, American grand strategy is not context-bound, basically because it dates back to the post-World War II period and has sought 'permanent world domination' (Chomsky 2003, p. 125). In a UN speech, Hugo Chavez hailed Chomsky's as a must-read book for everyone interested in knowing the threat of American imperialism. He also used it to refer to George Bush's desire to 'preserve the current pattern of domination, exploitation and pillage of the peoples of the world'. He entitled such desire 'the Devil's Recipe' (Stout 2006).
In this first chapter, we build on Chomsky's thesis and argue that while the search for American hegemony has often been associated with interventionism, the 1990s had a very specific character. While the search for 'permanent domination' during the Cold War had often been balanced by bipolarity through deterrence and containment, the passing of the USSR in the 1990s brought about an era of unipolarity, which made the US act with more freedom and aggressiveness. In its assertion of power the US relied heavily on the unipolar situation and made it a principal guide for the achievement of its grand strategy. 'Securitization' of threat was also another significant element related to the strategy.
The determination of order in Washington's political discourse had to do basically with the justification of power under the pretext of preserving international security. Chomsky argues that Washington was more concerned with its national security, particularly under 'George Bush II'. Nevertheless, the point we emphasise here is that such security concern was equally raised in the context of the war on Iraq in 1991. In January 1991 President Bush heralded a New World Order based on two facts: the collapse of communism—as the sign of the incontestable triumph of liberal capitalism over communism—and the war on Iraq as a confirmation of the new order. In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait the president delivered a speech that meant less a defence of freedom than an assertion of hegemony:

What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea: a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind —peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law... The end of the cold war has been a victory for all humanity... and America's leadership was instrumental in making it possible... The triump of democratic ideas in Eastern Europe and Latin America, and the

continuing struggle for freedom elsewhere around the world all confirm the wisdom of our nation's founders... For two centuries, America has served the world as an inspiring example of freedom and democracy.. .And today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable. (Bush 1991)    

The central message in the speech above contradicts sharply with other statements by President Bush. He had elsewhere emphasised a lenient policy that would 'reduce and control arsenals' and achieve 'just treatments of all peoples' (Nye 1992, p.83). Paradoxically, the oscillation between the two views reflected, as Joseph Nye puts it, confusion in the President's identification of the new order. He 'acted like Nixon, but borrowed the rhetoric of Wilson and Carter' (Nye 1992, p. 84). It means that he confused interventionism with Wilsonianism. The above speech reveals an invitation to an utter domination of the world rather than 'a new system of collective security' (Schwenninger 1999, p. 42)[1]. I For President Bush the New World Order is liberal democratic in spirit and the 'universal aspirations of mankind' ought to be reduced to the 'democratic ideas' that have historically been predominantly American in character. Strikingly, Fukuyama presents a very similar argument in The End of History and the Last man (1992).

From Latin America to Eastern Europe, from the Soviet Union to the Middle East and Asia, strong governments have been failing over the last decades.

And while they have not given way in all cases to stable liberal democracies, liberal democracy remains the only political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe. (Fukuyama 1992, p. xiii)

Fukuyama's celebration of the triumph of liberal democracy reflects America's thirst for being recognised as the guardian of liberty and the guarantor of prosperity. It was such a drive that operated President Bush's use of force against the Iraqi regime; Saddam Hussein was depicted as the threat to freedom in the Gulf. It is noteworthy here that the justification of power against Iraq was fuelled by the sentiment of being the superpower after the end of the Cold War. Bipolarity was over and it was, as Charles Krauthammer asserts, the 'unipolar moment' for the US. (Krauthammer 1991, pp. 23-33) Unipolarity, according to many analysts, was the defining feature of the post-Cold War world (Ikenberry 1996, pp. 79-80).
The realists, as Mastanduno tells us, have offered a sensible explanation for the US post-Cold War foreign policy behaviour both politically and economically. Kenneth Waltz's "balance-of-power theory" explains well how bipolarity used to keep the superpowers from acting in aggression against each other, basically because their perception of the international system was similar and that is why they resorted to 'very similar armaments policies, military doctrines, and intervention habits' (Mastanduno 1997, p. 53). With the end of the Cold War, both international structure and power balance have dramatically changed. Unipolarity has reigned. For Waltz, unipolarity made it possible for Washington 'to preserve America's position at the top of the international hierarchy. ' (Mastanduno 1997, p. 51).
In 1991, the American President George Bush defined the world order as nothing but a perfect condition in which the anomalous does not exist. Iraq was the anomaly to get rid of. But in order to be able to frame the Iraqi regime as a hostile regime and enemy to democracy it must be constructed as a veritable threat to his neighbours. Constructing Saddam as a threat makes it easy for the US to conduct a military campaign in the name of international justice and stability.
Securitization of the Iraqi threat, however, as some scholars argue, was responsive to America's wish to see Iraq invade Kuwait. In the Unholy Babylon: the Secret History of Saddam's War (1991) Darwish and Alexander revealed such wish (Darwish and Alexander 1991). In 1990 The New York Times published a document titled "Confrontation in the Gulf; Excerpts from Iraqi Document on Meeting with U.S. Envoy", which revealed facts about Washington's prior knowledge of Iraq's intention to invade Kuwait (Glaspie 1990). In a meeting prior to the war, the US ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie expressed the US position to Saddam:

But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. ..the issue is not associated with America... I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship - not in the spirit of confrontation – regarding your intentions. I simply describe the concern of my Government. And I do not mean that the situation is a simple situation. But our concern is a simple one. (Glaspie 1990)

Therefore, the US position raises an inherent paradox in American intentions towards the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. The open condemnation that followed from the  invasion reflects a hidden agenda behind the drive for neutrality and isolationism before the war. The one explanation that we advance here is that the strategy of power of which spoke Robert Kagan (2002) is conditioned by a realistic perception of international relations. The US did want to wage a full-scale war and that is why it had allowed the invasion without intercepting it. It could have deterred Hussein through serious menaces or could have launched quick strikes to bring him to the negotiation table.
Serious warning against Saddam's threat came only after the invasion. And, surprisingly, Washington's concern was far less about the Kuwaiti people than America's strategic interests in the Gulf. Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's national security adviser, contended that 'to let the Iraqis keep Kuwait would place the structure of Middle Eastern politics at risk. "They would dominate OPEC politics, Palestinian politics and the PLO, and lead the Arab world to the detriment of the United States. ... It seems while the alternatives are not attractive, we have to seriously look at the possibility that we can't tolerate him succeeding” (cited in Brands 2004). We learn from the Copenhagen School that the necessity of power assertion on the grounds of 'objective threat' requires the construction of such threat even on misleading grounds (Barry and Waever 2003). The national interests of the US were more important than the security of Kuwait and its freedom. Therefore, it was politically sensible to construct Saddam's threat on the basis of the invasion, and the goal was of course to serve America's imperialist ambitions in the Gulf. In doing so, the US could legitimate the necessity of power use. That would also present a historic opportunity to inaugurate the new unipolar world with a fresh appetite.
Securitization theory emphasises the fact that a threat should first of all be successfully proved to be 'an existential threat to a valued referent object', which would 'enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat' (Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 491). In the context of Iraq, very few would disagree that Saddam became a bully only after the long war against Iran in the 1980s; the US and Europe had seen him as their ally. But with the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam became the new enemy. That would give us an idea about American foreign policy behavior and its constantly changing securitization strategy. The implication of such behavior is that national interest would warrant the use of power and relocate the threat depending on the situation: the new threat now was Saddam.
Saddam was evoked as a danger to security only after ebbs and flows in Washington's evaluation of his threat. President Bush did not respond instantly but awaited his administration to pronounce the danger. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger warned that 'to let Saddam get away with his theft of Kuwait would set an ominous precedent. If he succeeds, others may try the same thing. It would be a bad lesson' (cited in Brands 2004). Dick Cheney revealed yet a stronger concern. If action could not be taken, Saddam would control 'OPEC, the Gulf and the Arab world' (cited in Brands 2004). In response to those calls the President finally firmly declared that 'this will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait (cited in Brands 2004).
Therefore, interventionism on the basis of the construction of Iraq as threat had been one strong feature of American foreign policy since 1990. Washington passed disorder for order due to the power behaviour which had to do with the end of bipolarity and, more so, the 'strategy of power' inherent in America's post-World War II political mind. The next section will look at how American power behaviour—the root of much of the world disorder—had to do also with the institutionalisation of leadership through what is known as the 'New American Century'.

II. The New American Century
This section examines how the drive for 'permanent domination' was nourished by yet a stronger motive: the aspiration to a 'New American Century'. Such a concept reflects a renewed old idea of empire building. We have selected two main documents which constitute and emphasise the idea of the New American Century. The first was a draft document published in the New York Times in March 1992 called the "Pentagon's Defence Planning Guidance" (DPG) and the second was the think tank ''Project for New American Century" (PNAC).

        The DPG's main message was as follows:

Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere. .. First, the U.S. must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order... Second... we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role (The New York Times 1992).

Obvious from the above objectives of the DPG are the features of the new world—as defined and understood by the US—and the future plans to strengthen America's leadership of the world. The first of the features was the triumph over Iraq, and the primary plan was to anticipate any sort of 'rivalry'. The key word in the draft is 'order'. The US ought to dissuade any competitors from changing 'the established [American] political and economic order'.
In his article "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise" (1993) Layne notices that the first draft document of the DPG was schizophrenic basically because a 'subsequent draft deleted the language referring to the goal of preserving unipolarity' (Layne 1993, pp. 5-6). The implication is that getting rid of such a language in a later draft confirms rather than refutes the US intention to make use of unipolarity to impose its model. The post-Cold War new world should be "manageable" in a way that no country would be allowed to forge new alliances and threaten America's strategic security and economic interests: Germany and Japan for instance were then a potential threat to Washington and had to be curbed (Layne 1993, pp. 6-7).
The wisdom of the DPG for the US was that it constituted a lesson for the future as a definite rejection of any 'bipolar' or even 'multipolar' situation. The US should be the only leader after the demise of the Soviet empire. Therefore, America's post- Cold War political behaviour was informed by the necessity of establishing active think tanks capable of forming 'an intellectual framework for America's post-Cold War grand strategy' (Layne 1993, p. 6). As Layne argues 'in a unipolar system, it is argued, the United States could avoid the unpredictable geopolitical consequences that would attend the emergence of new great powers. Unipolarity would, it is said, minimize the risks of both uncertainty and instability' (Layne 1993, p. 7).
Clearly, the DPG had been a precursor to a more assertive US role in international relations in the last years of the 20th century. As Mastanduno noticed in 1997, such a role concerned the renewed US appetite for 'preserving' its 'preeminent global position' (Mastanduno 1997, p.52). 'This grand strategy of preserving primacy', he argues, 'has spanned the Bush and Clinton administrations, notwithstanding differences in their foreign policy rhetoric. It has decisively shaped U.S. relations with Japan, Germany, Russia, and China' and has pushed American policy makers to play the carrot-and-stick game with major powers, that is, the 'security softball' and 'economic hardball' (Mastanduno 1997, pp. 51-52).
On the other hand, PNAC presents the formula for not only preserving hegemony but also transforming America into a veritable empire in total control of international relations. Clearly stated, the main aim of the PNAC was 'to promote American global leadership':

Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge.. .[What we require is] a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad... But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership of the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The history of the past century should have

taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership. (Thomas Donnelly et al 2000)

What was new about PNAC was the obvious invitation to an aggressive foreign policy in which hard power would be instrumental in bringing about peace and stability. A leading world role should primarily rest on the promotion of 'American principles' even through military power. In the words of Larbi Sadiki, American over- reliance on and 'blind continuous faith' in military power 'defeats the very purpose of peace'; the US testing of power in the Middle East is 'a microcosm of unfolding global disorder'. (Sadiki 1995, p. 1). Therefore, PNAC  itself was the medium for such a disorder, basically because of its explicit allusion to the use of power as a way for achieving 'peace and security'. The most noticeable of the think tank's aims is the necessity of 'embracing the cause of American leadership'.
The ideas expressed in the PNAC were of course by those who had formed their views of US leadership while serving in respective US administrations since the 1980s. The main participants in the Project included mainly Thomas Donnelly, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Francis Fukuyama and Paul Wolfowitz. The Project was then established by neo-conservative hardliners for whom American power counted as the only solution for a more stable world after the 'triumph of liberal democracy'. In a letter to President Bush the signatories to the Project addressed five issues that would help the US impose its model worldwide without resistance: to 'capture and kill Bin Laden', to do one's best 'to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq', to 'target Hezbollah' as a 'terrorist' organization, to 'support Israel and provide no further assistance to the Palestinian Authority', to increase the 'US defence budget' in order to 'fight' terrorism'. (Kristol et al 2001).
More famous among the PNAC participants was Fukuyama. He had served as a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State between 1981 and 1982 and later in 1989. He forged his thesis of the 'End of History' in 1989 and made use of such an idea in advertising liberal capitalism and the necessity of American leadership to fulfil the liberal democratic ideal. The PNAC constituted a suitable frame for Fukuyama to communicate his call for a world led by the US as the guardian of liberty and justice. Full support to PNAC was also received from such scholars as Harvard Professor Huntington. Huntington explained the necessity of an American future because Western civilisation would be undefeated for decades to come. Huntington's work is gripped by the idea of the 'conflict of civilisations'. It seeks to legitimate America's "exceptionalism" and the idea of unipolarity. He forged the term 'uni-multipolar' to describe the post-Cold War situation as controlled by mainly Europe, Asia and America, but with America the most powerful of all (Murray and Brown 2012, p. 2).
Huntington's controversial intellectual posture has provoked a hot debate. His argument for a permanent powerful Western civilisation has been criticised as parochial, prejudiced and pathological (Bakan 2005, p.270). Response came from Tarik Ali who argued that what caused further disorder was more of a 'clash of fundamentalisms' nourished by America: 'the most dangerous "fundamentalism" today —the mother of all fundamentalisms —is American imperialism,' and that this was 'amply vindicated in the first eighteen months after 11 September' (cited in Bakan 2005, p. 271). Such a view was reiterated by Archar in his argument that the 1991 war on Iraq was nothing but a new chapter in America's warmongering informed by neo-imperialist 'barbarism'. America's response to both the invasion of Kuwait and 9/11 was 'barbaric' (cited in Bakan 2005, pp.272-3).
III- Economic disorder
This third examines the question how the liberal capitalist order celebrated by Fukuyama and President Bush turned out to be a veritable disorder for three main reasons: the dubious US economic strategy, the widening gulf between the wealthy and the impoverished and the economic crises of the first decade of the 21 st century. The aim of this chapter is to call into question the belief that the triumph of capitalism meant a more stable and prosperous world. Capitalism has caused further unemployment, uneven development and alienation of the periphery.
The idea of the victory of capitalism was resolutely advanced and defended by Heilbroner in 1989 (Heilbroner 1989).Then Fukuyama confirmed the triumph with a more assertive conclusion that 'mankind has reached the end of history' thanks to the globalisation of 'liberal democracy and market-driven economies' (Fukuyama 1992, p. xi). He jubilantly concluded that 'liberal principles in economics—the " free market' '—have spread, and have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity, both in industrial developed countries and in countries that had been, at the close of World War II, part of the impoverished Third World' (Fukuyama 1992, p. xiii).
Critics of Heilbroner's and Fukuyama's stance describe the post-Cold War economic condition as 'chaotic' at best. Chaos derived from the fact that 'globalization' did 'push countries, communities, and groups of workers throughout the world to outcompete each other in a race to the bottom' (Broad 1998, p.6). President Bush's administration, for instance, used the Iraq war as a pretext for justifying America's presence in the Middle East to abuse the region's energy resources. W. R Clark argued that after the Cold War American foreign policy was ready to fight 'resource wars'. The need for dollar reserves necessitated the use of military power for the purpose of 'petrodollar recycling' (cited in Naji 2012, p. 7). According to Harshe, neo-imperialist reach of post-Cold War America had to do also with the extensive exploitation of the African continent. He attributes the American interest in accessing the riches of Africa to the problems of security related to 9/11 :

Actually with developments like the fall of the World Trade Centre towers on September 11. 2001 the rise of multiple kinds of terrorist outfits and political instability in the Arab countries, the US has been seriously exploring ways of gaining greater access to oil fields in African countries. In this context, a portrayal of the growing US presence on the oil scene in Africa can shed further light on the modus operandi of imperialism. (Harshe 2005, p. 2074).

It was for these reasons that the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG) was formed in order to cater for US oil demands. The African alternative was able to provide roughly ' 16 per cent' of the US need of oil. (Harshe 2005, p. 2074).
On the other hand, the imperialist reach in the 1990s and 2000s was greatly accompanied with power politics and the security strategy of the US. Realist theory emphasises very much this point. A powerful capitalist system must be based on a powerful defence system. This has to do with the 'balance of threat' strategy of the US to use its 'economic relationships and power as instruments of statecraft to reinforce its security strategy'. (Mastanduno 1997, p. 73). Extending the free market to the former Soviet bloc countries and Latin America would ensure more security to the US because, as realists believe, reducing economic competition by absorbing foreign markets and incorporating them into the liberal capitalist framework would reduce the risks of military competition. For Waltz, the risks of confrontation do arise from 'economic and technological competition' of great powers. A strong economy and a developed technology are the tools of the success. (Mastanduno 1997, p. 74).
Paradoxically, however, Fukuyama for instance, in his praise of the capitalist system, condemns the very premise on which a strong economic power like America is based: technology. In 1999, in an attempt to put across a clearer explanation of the merits of liberal capitalism, he commented that capitalism in itself cannot be held responsible for peoples' impoverishment or the greed with which many capitalists accumulate capital. The blame ought to be heaped on the 'immoral' mismanagement of capitalism as an economic system; 'crime and social disorder' are not the result of the capitalist system itself but the result of the transformations of the 'information age'. He blamed the abuse of 'social capital' on 'technology' whose fast development 'often exceeds the rate of social adjustment' and therefore opens horizons for 'selfish' exploitation (cited in Hopewell 2000, pp. 730-732).
On the other part, the argument for the ultimate victory of capitalism was belied by the widening gap between the wealthy and the impoverished. The results of an original project by Ukpere and Slabbert (2008) revealed that the predictions about capitalism's promises in the 1990s were erroneous.

Capitalism is actually void of foundation, and as such, lacks future and may not be the true goose that lays the golden egg. Its future is frighteningly bleak

and precarious... The ability of capital to relocate to low-wage countries in order to manufacture commodities that are exported back to the more developed world increases the disparity between productivity and real wages. ..A total of 800 million humans are either underemployed or unemployed, which represents a structural unemployment statistic of approximately 30 per cent.. .Moreover, with the exception of the newly industrialised countries, most third world nations have experienced dismal shortages of opportunities for waged labour, and the end of centralized planning has also brought large-scale unemployment to most countries in transition. .. (Ukpere and Slabbert, 2008, pp. 417-422)

The above study confirms that the so-called merits of capitalism have turned out to be its anomalies. Productivity, the heartbeat of capitalist economy has created a more class-based world; wage-labour, the so-called 19th century capitalist "blessing' for Western labourers has failed to accommodate the workers of the Third World in the 21 st century; and the attempts by capitalism to atone for the economic "curses" of bureaucratic-command economy have but ushered in further “unemployment" in the former countries of the Soviet bloc. Harshe confirms this posture by arguing that in its exploitation of the lower classes capitalism has been an all too devouring mode of production (Harshe 2005, p. 2072). Steel comments that in the late 20th century the capitalist system did create an American class structure privileging the elite and dumping the majority through an incompetent domestic policy (Steel 1995, pp. 1-7).
Steel's claim is forcefully defended by David Broad. The belief in liberal capitalism as a "perfect" form of government rests on a 'utopia' that embodies the unbridgeable gulf between theory and practice: 'the "liberal end of history" could suitably be described as utopia' because the 'celebration of the triumph of capitalism' has only produced a working class defeated by a dramatic rise in 'unemployment and poverty in the Eastern bloc countries... and the deterioration of 'employment conditions in the West'. (Broad, 1998, p. 6)
The capitalist utopia is further revealed by Zizek. While deepening the sense of socio-economic alienation in the third world and increasing the number of the world's poor—causing more delinquency, prostitution and Aids—capitalism has turned into a form of 'apartheid'. The capitalist sanctuary has fully estranged the 'slum-dwellers' of black Africa and Rio de Janerio. Shorn of decent living but consoled with phantasmic freedom of being outside the reach of the thriving Western city, the 'slum-dwellers'—multiplying as they are—have deceptively enjoyed stateless 'space' due to the absence of the 'rule of law'; and have thus been metamorphosed by capitalism into a lumpen-proletariat per excellence. This means that neo-capitalism has not only further alienated the already suffering working classes of the periphery but also engaged in a politics of lumpen-proletarianisation informed by a novel form of 'geopolitical apartheid'  (Zizek 2007).
Following the crisis of 2008 liberal capitalism reached a denouement. The crisis revealed that the system had rested on self-deception. As Saull concludes, the crisis 'marked a watershed for the financially driven neoliberal growth model' (Saull 2012, p. 323). Technically, the crisis can be explained as a system change due to the change of power balance and the weakening of globalisation. Ian Bremmer, the president of Eurasia Group, has recently explained the fluctuations. 1--1e has noticed pessimistically that the problem lies in the loss of equilibrium in the world due to an expected decrease of US role in both world politics and economy. Capitalism has begun to lose its 20 century resonance and appeal mainly because 'state capitalism' is replacing 'globalisation'—multinationals, etc—as the dominant system.

We will see it with the increasing power of national oil corporations, as opposed to multinationals; with state-owned enterprises in emerging markets becoming increasingly powerful, particularly in countries like China and Russia, also in the Gulf states; with the growth of sovereign wealth funds as increasingly important in the international investment climate.. .(Bremmer 2009).

The fluctuations of capitalism can be explained by the fact that the US has itself become heavily dependent on other economies, particularly China. As a consequence, disorder, Bremmer implies, has not arisen from US leadership and supremacy but from the loss of such leadership. Therefore, the world will enter a turmoil of relations of power far from the conventional way but nonetheless conducive to a lingering condition of 'winners and losers'. (Bremmer 2009). capitalism's believers will probably continue to struggle for a universal recognition that, however imperfect, capitalism remains the only system capable of offering employment opportunities and social well-being.

Conclusion
The essay has identified three main areas on which the post-Cold War 'World Disorder' has rested: power and unipolarity, the claim of the 'New American Century' and economic disorder. The first of such areas indicates that with the passing of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarity American power became more aggressive; for the most part, it rested on the "securitization" of threat.
The second aspect of disorder was associated with what came to be called the New American Century. We have argued that the drive for the New American Century was related to the document titled Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) published in 1992 and the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) founded in 1997. Both the DPG and PNAC represented an institutional pattern designed by Washington and supported by such the neo-cons as Fukuyama and Wolfowitz. The third aspect concerns American economic strategy, the socio-economic consequences of globalised capital and the 2008 crisis, which revealed serious anomalies in the capitalist economy.

 

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Author : Nawel Drissi
Researcher
 University of Leicester , UK

 

[1] Ted Carpenter contends that the confusion relates to the fact that the US has abusively acted as the "police of order" without considering "international stability ' and the promotion of "democracy": T. Carpenter , 'The New World Disorder', Foreign Policy, 84, 1991, p. 24.

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